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No other part of the constitutional system seems as deeply set 
in the American consciousness as the separation of powers. Be-
cause millions of Americans easily remember its tripartite nature 
and its enveloping system of checks and balances, it has become a 
bedrock of our civic culture. No matter that those famous checks 
and balances do not capture the realities of the struggles among the 
three branches in the late twentieth century. The realities are messy 
and indeterminate, for the branches' boundaries are indistinct and 
their relations feature accommodation as well as conflict. Reality 
aside, however, the neat simplicity of the formal view makes it easy 
to grasp and easy to honor as immutable truth. 
That false simplicity has bedeviled the doctrine of the separa-
tion from the very beginning. It was conceived in Montesquieu's 
understanding of evolving English institutions-one might say in 
his imposing a very French order, balance, and precision where 
none in fact existed. Among the constitution makers of the late 
eighteenth century, the separation satisfied the yearning for scien-
tific laws with which to design good and effective government. Our 
Constitution's framers were typical of their era in their pursuit of 
the "divine science of politics," as John Adams called it. What 
could have been more rewarding in that search for the laws of good 
government than the discovery of a system of forces and 
counterforces that held the three branches in a Newtonian equilib-
rium? So from the beginning the separation was framed in a 
mechanical simplicity and law-like certainty. 
Partly mythical though it was, the separation was at the very 
core of the institutional arrangements of the Constitution. It is not 
surprising that from time to time it has surfaced as an issue of con-
stitutional debate. That was certainly so in the 1930s when acts of 
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Congress delegating "legislative" power to administrative agencies 
were struck down by the Supreme Court, and in these last few de-
cades the separation has reemerged as a major constitutional issue. 
Professor Barbara Hinkson Craig's full-length study of Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha documents one of the major 
landmarks in that reemergence, for it was in Chadha that the 
Supreme Court abruptly ended Congress's increasing reliance on 
"legislative vetoes" over the rules and decisions of executive 
agencies. 
Professor Craig merges her study of the demise of the legisla-
tive veto with Jagdish Chadha's personal battle to avoid deportation 
and obtain permanent resident status in the United States. The 
book begins with Chadha's decision to leave his native Kenya and 
begin undergraduate study at Bowling Green State University in 
September, 1966. It ends with his reflections on his victory in the 
Supreme Court and his eventual naturalization in 1984. Interwoven 
with Chadha's story is a wider narrative about the litigation politics 
of the legislative veto. Along the way, other dramatis personnae 
make major appearances: former Representative Elliot Levitas, the 
congressional protagonist of the legislative veto; Alan Morrison of 
Public Citizen Litigation Group, Chadha's attorney before the 
Supreme Court; and Larry Simms, organizer of opposition to the 
legislative veto within the Justice Department. The book also in-
cludes detailed records of debates in Congress over the veto, and 
above all there are descriptions of the strategies, testimony, argu-
ments, briefs, and opinions in the court cases themselves. 
Lucidly and stylishly written, this is nevertheless a serious and 
comprehensive work, both the story of a celebrated case and a study 
of an ill-fated innovation in legislative-executive relations. Craig ex-
plores the legal arguments at great length, and does not hesitate to 
digress for didactic purposes-to explain to the lay reader theories 
of constitutional interpretation or the role of the courts of appeal, 
for example. The book is, in short, intended for a general audience, 
but also valuable to specialists. 
It is also a book of many felicities, serendipities, and excursions 
fruitfully taken. Craig casts a good deal of light, for example, on 
the advantages of group litigation and, conversely, on the helpless-
ness of the lonely plaintiff and the inexperienced attorney. She also 
documents once again the imperatives of public office as two presi-
dential administrations, both sympathetic initially to the legislative 
veto, came to realize its threat to the interests of the executive. 
I have, however, two related reservations about this splendid 
book. First, in Craig's account the case against the legislative veto 
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overpowers the case for it. In part that imbalance results from the 
book's emphasis on the perils of Jagdish Chadha. One finds oneself 
cheering the arrival of the judicial cavalry to save a decent man 
from deportation to a country (Great Britain) which he had never 
known and of which he was not a citizen. 
Related to that problem is a more fundamental one. Since this 
is a study of litigation, it is cast largely in conventional legal catego-
ries. Accordingly, Craig treats the separation in terms that the 
courts and popular myths have long favored: terms of encroach-
ment and conflict rather than accommodation and compromise, of a 
neat and discrete exercise of powers rather than an overlapping and 
approximate one. The result is to load the case against the legisla-
tive veto in particular and more generally against adaptive views of 
the separation. 
Chadha may have been a good decision, but it was a closer case 
than Craig suggests. Indeed, both the legislative veto and its demise 
raise complex and troublesome questions about the nature and fu-
ture of Congress. Put in traditional constitutional terms, the legis-
lative veto is an aggrandizement of congressional power at the 
expense of the equal and coordinate executive branch and an at-
tempt to "pass" legislation without the required approval of the 
president. In reality, of course, it is a sign of Congress's problems 
and troubles-of its crowded and deadlocked agenda, of the in-
creasingly complex demands of constituents and contributors, of its 
inability to hold its own against both a media-based, imperial presi-
dency and the regulators in executive agencies. 
There is, in other words, a powerful political case for the legis-
lative veto which is slighted here. It is a case one has to reckon 
with, at least to understand why the legislative veto did not die with 
Chadha.3 The truth is that Congress continues to pass legislative 
vetoes and variants of legislative vetoes, and they remain in force 
because it is in both branches' political interest to do so and not be 
challenged. They survive because they are part of a grand bargain 
in which Congress acquiesces in the vesting of greater and greater 
discretionary authority in the hands of agencies in the executive 
branch. They are, indeed, a part of the bargain that makes the ad-
ministrative state of the late twentieth century politically acceptable 
to the Congress. 
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge 
Anthony Kennedy, disposed of Chadha on grounds that were un-
3. Readers who want to explore the survival of the legislative veto and its cousins post· 
Chadha should consult Louis Fisher's richly authoritative article, Judicial .'lfisjudgments 
About the Lawmaking Process: The Legis/ati•·e Veto Ca>e. 45 PLB. ADMI~. REV. 705 (1985). 
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characteristically narrow for a separation case: legislative en-
croachment on the judiciary's role in reviewing the adjudications of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. That ground, the 
court acknowledged, left open the possibility that in other settings 
the legislative veto might pass constitutional muster. It was pre-
cisely the kind of restrained decision that stamped Judge Kennedy 
as an appropriate successor to Justice Powell. 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, choosing instead to 
strike down all legislative vetoes. Any legislative action taken by 
Congress, wrote Chief Justice Burger, must conform to the consti-
tutional requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the 
president: 
Disagreement with the Attorney General"s decision on Chadha's deportation-that 
is. Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' original choice to 
delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves de-
terminations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral 
pa!>sage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its dele-
gation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked4 
The majority thus swept aside possible distinctions among various 
types of legislative vetoes. Chadha reflected the traditional and for-
mal view of the separation. 
Chadha also raises questions concerning the role of the Court 
in interpreting the Constitution. Attorney General Meese tried to 
rally American lawyers and judges around a standard of "original 
intent;" it is but one of a number of interpretive theories (plain 
meaning of the words, neutral principles, etc.) that seek to define a 
limited judicial role. Most legal scholars have rejected Meesism in 
favor of an interpretive stance that would reflect contemporary 
meanings, that would address contemporary issues, that would keep 
the text alive by contemporary standards-that would, in short, jus-
tify more expansionist interpretations and greater constitutional 
change and adaptability in order to protect individual rights against 
modern dangers and in light of modern values. The Bork hearings, 
moreover, indicated that those views are very widely held. They 
certainly seem to be held by most of the Justices, in practice if not 
always in theory. 
But just a minute. What about the need of the institutions es-
tablished by the Constitution to adapt to twentieth-century de-
mands and pressures? What of the problems of government itself as 
it is transformed both by mass, popular democracy, and the weight 
and power of the welfare state? Are we to live by an expansionist 
interpretive creed for the Bill of Rights and by the narrow norm of 
4. INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919. 954-55 (1983). 
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original intent for the rest of the Constitution? Do we promote con-
stitutional health by accommodating change in what government 
does without accommodating change in how it does it? 
Of course, greater sophistication about the separation would 
not necessarily entail disapproval of the result in Chadha; the legis-
lative veto can be criticized on other, less formalistic grounds. Even 
so, the formalism of the Chadha opinion may have affected the re-
sults in subsequent cases. To be sure, Chadha was not the first in 
the recent spate of judicial invalidations of congressional acts based 
(in at least substantial part) on the separation of powers; Buckley v. 
Valeo,s for example, was an earlier decision. Chadha has been the 
progenitor of the recent separation cases, perhaps because the issue 
was much more central to its facts and judgment, and its offspring 
show the same signs of a traditional, formal, conflict-centered view 
of the separation as does Chadha. 
Take, for instance, Bowsher v. Synar,6 the successful challenge 
to the central role of the Comptroller General in the emergency 
budget-cutting procedures of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Writing 
for an eight-Justice majority, Chief Justice Burger settled the matter 
in phrases of magisterial certitude: "The structure of the Constitu-
tion does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that 
Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control [i.e., the 
Comptroller General] what it does not possess." 7 The separation, 
thus understood, is remarkably clear, simple, and unreal. It ignores 
all of the ways in which Congress does in fact participate in execut-
ing the laws-see the civil rights and voting rights acts of the 
1960s-just as the delegation decisions have long ignored the extent 
to which executive agencies exercise the very essence of legislative 
powers. 
After this explication of the separation, and a substantial obei-
sance to Chadha, Chief Justice Burger dismissed the policy reasons 
for a permissive interpretation of the separation as mere arguments 
of "convenience" and "efficiency." In Burger's analysis, all of the 
issues of flexibility and change in a two hundred year old document 
are seen as transitory, if not trivial, easily yielding to fundamental 
principles. 
The Supreme Court's decision in In reSealed Case,s upholding 
the independent counsel ("special prosecutor"), may portend a 
5. 424 U.S. I ( 1976) 
6. 478 U.S 714 (1986). 
7. /d. at 726. 
8. In reSealed Case. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). n·•·"d sub. nom. Morrison v. Ol-
son. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
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more flexible view of the separation. In any event, the parade of 
separation issues will not stop. On June 13, 1988, the Court agreed 
to decide the constitutionality of the new federal guidelines for sen-
tencing convicted criminals, without waiting for appeals from dis-
trict court cases to wend their ways through the courts of appeals. 9 
At the time it granted jurisdiction, one newspaper estimated that 
more than eighty federal district courts had held the rules unconsti-
tutional while about sixty had ruled them constitutional.Io Many of 
those eighty invalidated the guidelines because they believed that 
the United States Sentencing Commission, which wrote them, was 
composed in ways that violated the separation, either because Con-
gress directed the president to include at least three federal judges 
among the members of the Commission or because it delegated ex-
cessive and undirected power to it. 
In short, we are in the very middle, the epicenter if you will, of 
the greatest storm of constitutional litigation on the separation of 
powers in the nation's two hundred years. After all, in the battles 
over congressional delegations of rulemaking power in the 1930s, 
the Court relied on separation grounds only twice. II Why then has 
the separation now become so prominent in constitutional adjudica-
tion? Part of the explanation, perhaps, is the high tide of judicial 
activism which has made it seem appropriate for the Court to settle 
great issues of power and procedure. No doubt it also reflects the 
long periods of control of Congress and the presidency by different 
political parties. The Democrats have controlled at least one house 
of Congress continuously for the two decades between 1968 and 
1988, while the Republicans have held the presidency for sixteen of 
the twenty years. From such basic political facts do great conten-
tions arise; an interventionist Court has made them constitutional 
issues. 
For an introduction to all of this, Barbara Craig's Chadha is 
warmly welcome. It describes the constitutional terrain and the 
battles fought on it. It does so with a wealth of detail and color, and 
with a firm grasp of the politics of constitutional litigation. But 
these reportorial strengths are also the book's weaknesses. It plays 
by the rules of the judicial forum and judicial rhetoric, and thus it 
largely accepts the traditional judicial view of the separation-the 
struggles and competitions among three completely separated 
branches-and the assumptions and formalisms behind it. Craig's 
9. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), aff'g Johnson v. United States, 
682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.O. Mo. 1988). 
10. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at A24, col. 5. 
II. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
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purposes do not include a challenge to the traditional rhetoric or a 
full explication of the realities of separation, the hard bargains of 
wary accommodation between the branches, and the transforma-
tions wrought by the realities of positive government in an ad-
vanced industrial nation. By observing the tradition of formulaic 
discourse on the separation, this book marks the extent to which 
that tradition dominates our jurisprudence and the extent to which 
we have become its willing prisoners. 
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The stated purpose of this book is to "attempt a general survey 
and evaluation of the field of law and literature." Judge Richard 
Posner recognizes at the outset, however, that there is a substantial 
question whether any such field of study can be meaningfully de-
fined, any more so than, say, law and biology. Indeed, Judge Pos-
ner's main reason for assembling this group of disparate materials, 
some previously published, seems to be to demonstrate that literary 
criticism and literary theory really have very little to contribute to 
the study and understanding of law-except perhaps to improve the 
writing of judicial opinions. Even less surprisingly, he also con-
cludes that legal scholars have little to contribute to the understand-
ing and appreciation of literature. 
Posner finds five important connections between law and litera-
ture. First, many literary works-for example, The Merchant of 
Venice, Bleak House, The Brothers Karamazov, The Stranger, The 
Trial, The Caine Mutiny-are about or at least involve law or legal 
proceedings. "The legal matter in most literature," however, Pos-
ner concludes after examining several such works, "is peripheral to 
the meaning and significance of the literature." A related conclu-
sion is that "legal knowledge is often irrelevant to the understand-
ing and enjoyment of literature on legal themes." 
Second, and much more promising it might seem, literary 
scholarship is like legal scholarship in that both are concerned with 
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